somewhat like Henkin's nonstandard interpretation of higher-order logics, while the right semantics [or logical modalities is an analogue to the standard of type theory in Henkin's sense. interpretation Another possibility would be to follow W.V. Quine's advice to give up logi­ cal modalities as being beyond repair. Or we could also try to develop a logic of conceptual possibility, restricting the range of our "possible worlds" to those compatible with the transcendental presuppositions of our own conceptual sys­ tem. This looks (...) in fact like one of the most interesting possible theories I have dreamt of developing but undoubtedly never will. Its kinship with Kant's way of thinking should be obvious. Besides putting the entire enterprise of possible-worlds semantics into a perspective, we can also see that the actual history of possible-worlds seman­ tics is more complicated than it might first appear to be. For the standard in­ terpretation of modal logics has reared its beautiful head repeatedly in the writings of Stig Kanger, Richard Montague the pre-Montague-semantics theorist, and Nino Cocchiarella. (shrink)

This collection of essays, first published two decades ago, presents central feminist critiques and analyses of natural and social sciences and their philosophies. Unfortunately, in spite of the brilliant body of research and scholarship in these fields in subsequent decades, the insights of these essays remain as timely now as they were then: philosophy and the sciences still presume kinds of social innocence to which they are not entitled. The essays focus on Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Marx; on (...) the 'adversary method' model of philosophic reasoning; on principles of individuation on philosophical ontology and philosophy of language; on individualistic assumptions in psychology; functionalism in sociological and biological theory; evolutionary theory; the methodology of political science; and conceptions of objective inquiry in the sciences. In taking insights of both Liberal and Marxian women's movements into the purportedly most abstract and value-free areas of Western thought, these essays chart sexist and androcentric assumptions, claims and practices in the cognitive, technical cores of Western sciences and their philosophies. They begin to identify the distinctive aspects of women's experiences and locations in male-supremacist social structures which can provide resources needed for the creation of post-androcentric thinking in research, scholarship, and public policy. Such uses of feminist insights remain controversial today, and even among some feminists. These authors were all junior researchers and scholars two decades ago; today many are among the most distinguished senior scholars in their fields. Their work here provides a splendid opportunity for upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy and the social sciences to explore some of the most intriguing and controversial challenges to disciplinary projects and to public policy today. (shrink)

This collection brings together previously unpublished works by well-known philosophers on the philosophy of action, the metaphysics of causality, and the philosophy of psychology. Nine of the essays directly discuss Donald Davidson's work on these topics, while three others challenge a Davidsonian approach through discussion of independent but related issues. These essays are followed by replies from Davidson, including a previously unpublished essay, "Adverbs of Action.".

"Homage to Rudolph Carnap."--Hempel, C. G. Rudolf Carnap, logical empiricist.--Wedberg, A. How Carnap built the world in 1928.--Eberle, R. A construction of quality classes improved upon the Aufbau.--Carnap, R. Observation language and theoretical language.--Kaplan, D. Significance and analyticity: a comment of some recent proposals of Carnap.--Wójcicki, R. The factual content of empirical theories.--Williams, P. M. On the conservative extensions of semantical systems: a contribution to the problem of analyticity.--Winnie, J. A. Theoretical analyticity.--Wedberg, A. Decision and belief in science.--Bohnert, H. G. (...) Carnap's logicism.--Hintikka, J. Carnap's heritage in logical semantics.--Partee, B. H. The semantics of belief-sentences.--Kasher, A. Pragmatic representations and language-games.--Carnap, R. Notes on probability and induction.--Jeffrey, R. C. Carnap's inductive logic.--Hilpinen, R. Carnap's new system of inductive logic.--Kuipers, T. A. F. A generalization of Carnap's inductive logic. Essler, W. K. Hintikka versus Carnap.--Hintikka, J. Carnap and Essler versus inductive generalization.--Shimony, A. Carnap on entropy, introduction to "Two essays on entropy" by Rudolf Carnap. (shrink)

This paper discusses Jean van Heijenoort’s (1967) and Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka’s (1986, 1997) distinction between logic as auniversal language and logic as a calculus, and its applicability to Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. Although it is argued that Husserl’s phenomenology shares characteristics with both sides, his view of logic is closer to the model-theoretical, logic-as-calculus view. However, Husserl’s philosophy as transcendental philosophy is closer to the universalist view. This paper suggests that Husserl’s position shows that holding a (...) model-theoretical view of logic does not necessarily imply a calculus view about the relations between language and the world. The situation calls for reflection about the distinction: It will be suggested that the applicability of the van Heijenoort and the Hintikkas distinction either has to be restricted to a particular philosopher’s views about logic, in which case no implications about his or her more general philosophical views should be inferred from it; or the distinction turns into a question of whether our human predicament is inescapable or whether it is possible, presumably by means of model theory, to obtain neutral answers to philosophical questions. Thus the distinction ultimately turns into a question about the correct method for doing philosophy. (shrink)

In a definition (∀ x )(( x є r )↔D[ x ]) of the set r, the definiens D[ x ] must not depend on the definiendum r . This implies that all quantifiers in D[ x ] are independent of r and of (∀ x ). This cannot be implemented in the traditional first-order logic, but can be expressed in IF logic. Violations of such independence requirements are what created the typical paradoxes of set theory. Poincaré’s Vicious Circle Principle (...) was intended to bar such violations. Russell nevertheless misunderstood the principle; for him a set a can depend on another set b only if ( b є a ) or ( b ⊆ a ). Likewise, the truth of an ordinary first-order sentence with the Gödel number of r is undefinable in Tarki’s sense because the quantifiers of the definiens depend unavoidably on r. (shrink)

The working assumption of this paper is that noncommuting variables are irreducibly interdependent. The logic of such dependence relations is the author's independence-friendly (IF) logic, extended by adding to it sentence-initial contradictory negation ¬ over and above the dual (strong) negation ∼. Then in a Hilbert space ∼ turns out to express orthocomplementation. This can be extended to any logical space, which makes it possible to define the dimension of a logical space. The received Birkhoff and von Neumann "quantum logic" (...) can be interpreted by taking their "disjunction" to be ¬(∼A & ∼ B). Their logic can thus be mapped into a Boolean structure to which an additional operator ∼ has been added. (shrink)

Jaakko Hintikka's concept of belief (aBp) as presented in his Knowledge and Belief is such that in his epistemic logic aKp —> aBp is a thesis. This concept (B-belief) is one important kind of belief and can be contrasted with a different concept of belief (G-belief, denoted by 'aOp') not discussed in Hintikka's book. It is to some extent opposite to the one above in the sense that it is knowledge-exclusive, whereas Hintikka's is knowledge-inclusive. This is (...) shown by the thesis aKp —> —laGp or aGp —> —laKp. My thesis is that this kind of belief is used as the belief in scientific hypothesis and as religious belief. Both G-belief and B-belief are applied to examples from physics and religion and consistency criteria are discussed for either concept. (shrink)

Summary A survey of recent work in the philosophy of science in Finland, with a bibliography. The main sources of influence emphasized are Eino Kaila (1890–1958) and G. H. von Wright (b. 1916). The main topics covered are: induction and probability; information and explanation; the acceptance and application of theories; the role of auxiliary (theoretical) terms; measurement; general methodology of social and behavioral sciences; finalistic explanation; methodology of sociology and history.

SummaryCarnap tried to overcome metaphysics through a distinction between empirical and conceptual truths. The distinction has since been challenged, but not on the basis of a systematic logical analysis of language. It is suggested here that the logical theory of identifiability based on the author's interrogative model will provide the tools for such a systematic analysis. As an example of what the model can do, a criticism is offered of Quine's and Chomsky's implicit assumption that language learning is based on (...) atomistic “answers” .RésuméCarnap a essayé de dépasser la métaphysique par une distinction entre des vérités empiriques et des vérités conceptuelles. Cette distinction a ensuite été contestée, mais non sur la base ?une analyse systematique du langage. On suggére ici que la théorie logique de ľidentifiabilité basée sur le modéle interrogatif de ľauteur fournira les outils ?une telle analyse systématique. Comme exemple de ce que peut faire ce modéle, on présente une critique de la supposition implicite de Quine et de Chomsky selon laquelle ľapprentissage du langage repose sur des ≫réponses≪ atomiques .ZusammenfassungCarnap versuchte Metaphysik durch eine Unterscheidung zwischen empirischen und konzep‐tuellen Wahrheiten zu iiberwinden. Seither wurde die Unterscheidung immer wieder angegriffen, jedoch nicht auf der Basis einer systematischen logischen Analyse der Sprache. In vorliegendem Artikel wird vorgeschlagen, dass eine logische Theorie der Identifizierbarkeit, welche auf dem Frage‐Antwort‐Modell des Autors grilndet, die Instrumente fur eine solche logische Analyse bereitstellt. Als Beispiel dafiir, was das Modell leisten kann, dient eine Kritik an Quines und Chomskys impliziter Voraussetzung, dass das Erlernen von Sprache auf atomaren ≫Antworten≪ aufbaut. (shrink)

Contemporary legal and political discourse includes three different models of minority groups. The outsider group model is applied to groups defined by status that experience political and economic disadvantages, plausibly attributable to that status, which are regarded as unjust. The adversity group model is applied to groups defined by their relationship to a discrete decision or event that imposes disproportionate losses on the group, which are regarded as unjust. And the transfer group model is applied to groups defined by a (...) shared interest that are differentially advantaged in obtaining benefits from the political system, which are regarded as unjust. This paper argues that with respect to a number of contestable policy questions involving minority groups - such as affirmative action and the NIMBY syndrome - proponents of the group employ the outsider group model, opponents apply the transfer group model, and centrist politicians and judges prefer the adversity group model. It further argues that the model adopted in doubtful cases will have a strong influence on our preferences for different constitutional structures. One who inclines toward the outsider group model will favor a Rawlsian constitution with strong judicial enforcement of a bill of rights; one who favors the adversity group model will prefer a liberal constitution with few deviations from majority rule; and one who gravitates toward the transfer group model will be drawn to a Madisonian constitution that seeks to frustrate group demands in favor of consideration of diffuse majority interests. Der Beitrag beschreibt drei verschiedene Modelle, die in der gegenwärtigen juristischen und politischen Diskussion benutzt werden, wenn es darum geht, mit Bezug auf Minderheitsgruppen zu argumentieren. Das "Außenseiter-Modell" definiert eine Gruppe durch ihren Status und durch die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Nachteile, die die Gruppe offensichtlich aufgrund dieses Status erleidet und die als ungerecht angesehen werden. Das "Sonderopfer-Modell" definiert eine Gruppe durch ihre Relation auf eine konkrete Entscheidung oder einen konkreten Vorfall , der dieser Gruppe unverhältnismäßig hohe Verluste auferlegt, die als ungerecht angesehen werden. Das "Transfer-Modell" schließlich definiert eine Gruppe durch ein gemeinsames Interesse und durch das ausgeprägte Vermögen, vom politischen System Vergünstigungen zu erlangen, die als ungerecht betrachtet werden. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, daß eine Reihe von strittigen Fragen der Politik, die einen Bezug zu Minderheitsgruppen aufweisen - z.B. "affirmative action" und das "NIMBY-Syndrome" -, in der Weise behandelt werden, daß Fürsprecher einer solchen Gruppe das "Außenseiter-Modell" gebrauchen, Gegner der Gruppe das "Transfer-Modell" anwenden und Politiker der Mitte und Richter das "Sonderopfer-Modell" bevorzugen. Darüber hinaus wird gezeigt, daß das Modell, das sich jemand angesichts umstrittener Sachverhalte zu eigen macht, einen starken Einfluß auf seine Vorlieben für bestimmte Verfassungsstrukturen ausübt. Wer dem "Außenseiter-Modell" zuneigt, wird für eine Rawls'sche Verfassung mit strikter, gerichtlich gewährleisteter Durchsetzung eines Grundrechtskatalogs eintreten; wer das "Sonderopfer-Modell" befürwortet, wird eine liberale Verfassung mit nur wenigen Abweichungen vom Mehrheitsprinzip vorziehen; wer zum "Transfer-Modell" tendiert, wird sich zu einer Madison'schen Verfassung hingezogen fühlen, die danach trachtet, Forderungen einzelner Gruppen zugunsten der Berücksichtigung diffuser Mehrheitsinteressen zu durchkreuzen. (shrink)

Richard Popkin gives the frame into which the topics of the colloquium fit: Cartesian skepticism about our knowledge of the existence of the self and the external world. Robert Fogelin sketches a prescriptive model for human action, using classical and contemporary ideas on the grammar of act descriptions. Following these individual papers, there are three symposia, consisting of a paper, comments, and author's reply. In the first, with Philip Hugly as commentator, Fred Dretske attempts to undercut skeptical attack on the (...) validity of ordinary perceptual claims. He holds that an epistemic perceptual report conveys two items: a description, and a justification of the increment in knowledge which is the crux of each particular claim. The second symposiast is Roderick Chisholm, writing with historical fluency and analytic skill on the loose and strict senses of identity. In his comments, S. Shoemaker offers a "special concern" criterion for personal identity. In the third symposium, Jaakko Hintikka argues that the logic of perceptual terms is modal, in the extended sense that most of the words used to express propositional attitudes, words like 'knows', 'believes', 'strives', serve as modal operators. Romane Clark is Hintikka's commentator. Again, the comments seem genuinely helpful in clarifying or emphasizing the issues for the reader. Hintikka tells us that he finds that traditional problems in perception are closely related to difficulties logicians have met as they try to understand the interplay between modal notions and the basic logical concepts of identity and existence. His comment expresses the sense of discovery and promise which pervades these papers. It strikes one that this Colloquium achieved a felicitous combination of high-level technique and creative scholarship.--M. B. M. (shrink)

Epistemic minimalism affirms that mere true belief is sufficient for propositional knowledge. I construct a taxonomy of some specific forms of minimalism and locate within that taxonomy the distinct positions of various advocates of minimalism, including Alvin Goldman, Jaakko Hintikka, Crispin Sartwell, Wolfgang Lenzen, Franz von Kutschera, and others. I weigh generic minimalism against William Lycan’s objection that minimalism is incompatible with plausible principles about relations between knowledge, belief, and confidence. I argue that Lycan’s objection fails for equivocation (...) but that some specific forms of minimalism are better able than others to articulate that defense. (shrink)

Jaakko hintikka claims to have explained the (only quasi-Logical) absurdity of (m) "p but I don't believe that p". I argue that, While his explicans (b) is true so far as it goes, It is as badly in need of explanation as is (m) itself. I offer two lines of reasoning designed to account for (b) and further to localize the absurdity of (m); but I do not claim to have given the whole story.

ABSTRACTTo build a process model of the understanding of conditionals we extract a common core of three semantics of if-then sentences: the conditional event interpretation in the coherencebased probability logic, the discourse processingtheory of Hans Kamp, and the game-theoretical approach of Jaakko Hintikka. The empirical part reports three experiments in which each participant assessed the probability of 52 if-then sentencesin a truth table task. Each experiment included a second task: An n-back task relating the interpretation of conditionals to (...) working memory, a Bayesian bookbag and poker chip task relating the interpretation of conditionals to probability updating, and a probabilistic modus ponens task relating the interpretation of conditionals to a classical inference task. Data analysis shows that the way in which the conditionals are interpreted correlates with each of the supplementary tasks. The results are discussed within the process model proposed in the introduction. (shrink)

I n order to appreciate properly what we are doing in this book it is necessary to realize that our approach to linguistic theorizing differs from the prevailing views. Our approach can be described by indicating what distinguishes it from the methodological ideas current in theoretical linguistics, which I consider seriously misguided. Linguists typically construe their task in these days as that of making exceptionless generalizations from particular examples. This explanatory strategy is wrong in several different ways. It presupposes that (...) we can have "intuitions" about particular examples, usually examples invented by the linguist himself or herself, reliable and sharp enough to serve as a basis of sharp generalizations. It also presupposes that we cannot have equally reliable direct access to general linguistic regularities. Both assumptions appear to me extremely dubious, and the first of them has in effect been challenged by linguists like Dwight Bol inger. There is also some evidence that the degree of unanimity among linguists is fairly low when it comes to less clear cases, even in connection with such relatively simple questions as grammaticality (acceptability). For this reason we have tried to rely more on quotations from contemporary fiction, newspapers and magazines than on linguists' and philosophers' ad hoc examples. I also find it strange that some of the same linguists as believe that we all possess innate ideas about general characteristics of humanly possible grammars assume that we can have access to them only via their particular consequences. (shrink)

One enduring legacy of the twentieth century will be the slow, certain transformation of the world from insular civilizations to interactive societies enmeshed in global systems of electronic communication, economics, and politics. Financial news from Thailand or Brazil is often more important globally than political events in the old centers of power. Some bemoan the uncertainty and flux of all this. However, the mutual definition of the world’s societies presents an extraordinary opportunity to humanize a situation that all too quickly (...) could degenerate into a Weberian ‘iron cage’ of truly global proportions. What contribution can the world’s great philosophical traditions make toward humanity’s common task of civilizing the rise of globalization? Here the ancient concept of paideia walks upon the stage of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

In two earlier volumes, entitled The Logico-Algebraic Approach to Quan tum Mechanics, I have presented collections of research papers which trace out the historical development and contem porary flowering of a particular approach to physical theory. One might characterise this approach as the extraction of an abstract logico-algebraic skeleton from each physical theory and the reconstruction of the physical theory as construction of mathematical and interpretive 'flesh' on this skeleton. The idea is to show how the specific features of a (...) theory that are easily seen in application arise out of the character of its core abstract structure. In this fashion both the deeper nature of a theory and the deeper differences between theories are penetratingly illuminated. What I would describe as the 'mainstream' logico-algebraic tradition is captured in these two collections of papers. The abstract, structural approach to the characterisation of physical theory has been the basis of a striking transformation, in this century, in the understanding of theories in mathematical physics. There has emerged clearly the idea that physical theories are most significantly characterised by their abstract structural components. (shrink)

It is far from clear what is meant by logic or what should be meant by it. It is nevertheless reasonable to identify logic as the study of inferences and inferential relations. The obvious practical use of logic is in any case to help us to reason well, to draw good inferences. And the typical form the theory of any part of logic seems to be a set of rules of inference. This answer already introduces some structure into a discussion (...) of the nature of logic, for in an inference we can distinguish the input called a premise or premises from the output known as the conclusion. The transition from a premise or a number of premises to the conclusion is governed by a rule of inference. If the inference is in accordance with the appropriate rule, it is called valid. Rules of inference are often thought of as the alpha and omega of logic. Conceiving of logic as the study of inference is nevertheless only the first approximation to the title question, in that it prompts more questions than it answers. It is not clear what counts as an inference or what a theory of such inferences might look like. What are the rules of inference based on? Where do we find them? The ultimate end. (shrink)

Proceedings of the 1970 Stanford Workshop on Grammar and Semantics.